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It is striking that a word which a generation ago carried no particular
moral weight and had, at most, a modestly benign connotation, should in
this generation have become the most fiercely contested word in American
higher education. On the left, "diversity" is today the banner behind which
the most progressive programs and ideas are marshaled. On the right, the
same word has come to symbolize everything objectionable in
contemporary educational practice. From one point of view, diversity
seems the fulfillment of a liberal ideal of education. From another, it
appears the antithesis of it. The battle lines are well-formed, and long
familiar, and the passions which the diversity debate arouses on both sides
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make it difficult to sustain an intermediate position that is sympathetic and
skeptical at once.
In this essay, I shall make an effort to define and defend a position of
this sort, recognizing in advance the danger that it will appeal to the
partisans of neither camp. But I have come to believe that the answer to the
question posed by the title of my essay-is diversity a value in American
higher education?--calls for a complex judgment that respects the ways in
which programs of racial and ethnic diversification both promote the aims
of liberal learning and challenge them as well. These aims transcend the
circumstances of American life. They have a broad human meaning and
value that reach beyond the historical and institutional peculiarities of our
national community. Yet we can pursue them only in the context of the
world we actually inhabit, and for Americans this means a world of
continuing racial and ethnic divisions that still shape our experience to an
impressive degree. Viewed from the latter-American-perspective, there
are strong reasons for thinking that racial and ethnic diversity is essential
to liberal education. But viewed from the former-cosmopolitanperspective, there are reasons for worrying that the identification of racial
and ethnic diversity with diversity of perceptions, judgments and, values,
may impede the goals of liberal learning as well as advance them. I believe
we must make an effort to hold onto both perspectives and that neither can
be sacrificed without losing something of great importance in American
higher education. But the difficulties of doing this are considerable, given
the pressure to be "for" or "against" diversity without reservation. This
essay is conceived in the hope that our choices are not so stark.
I. THE DIVERSITY DEBATE
It will be helpful to start by recalling the history of the diversity debate.
Like so many other features of our current moral landscape, the debate
over diversity in American higher education begins with the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. BoardofEducation.' In that famous case, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a number of state laws requiring the
segregation of public schools by race.2 After Brown, the institution of de
jure segregation was doomed, though its actual elimination took time,
effort and blood. But Brown did nothing to upset the pattern of de facto
segregation that existed in the South and elsewhere, a pattern that was the
product of social and economic forces protected by the law though not
directly mandated by it. If the promise of Brown-the promise of
desegregation-was ever to be realized, it would be necessary, many
argued, to extend Brown's assault on the legal underpinnings of

1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See id. at 493.
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segregation to an attack on the complex system of prejudice, wealth and
residence that guaranteed the perpetuation of racial segregation long after
the Supreme Court had declared it unlawful.
From this conviction, rooted in the sound observation that legal norms
always operate against a background of social and economic forces whose
influence limits the law's effectiveness as an instrument of moral change,
sprang a wide range of new programs, known as programs of "affirmative
action," some mandated by legislation and others created by the voluntary
decisions of institutions both public and private. The common aim of these
programs was to increase the share of various social and economic
goods-jobs, contracts, educational opportunities and the like-that
disadvantaged minorities enjoy, and thereby change the background
conditions that frustrate the achievement of racial justice.
Many different sorts of institutions were affected by these
programs-police departments, government offices, private companies and
schools. But schools were widely viewed as a uniquely important locus of
affirmative action. Education is today a prerequisite for social and
economic success in most areas of life. It is the gateway through which one
must pass on the way to most careers. By comparison with other sorts of
wealth, the special kind that consists in the possession of an education-of
what economists call human capital-has in this century steadily increased
in importance, as knowledge has become an ever larger factor of
production.3 Because affirmative action is essentially a program of
redistribution whose goal is to increase the wealth and opportunities that
disadvantaged groups possess, it is not surprising that proponents of such
programs should have focused as 6arly as they did on schools, where so
much of the human capital in America is now produced.
Colleges and universities, including graduate and professional schools,
had by the late 1960s become a significant arena of affirmative action. The
first of these programs concentrated on student admissions and sought, by
one means or another, to increase the percentage of minority students
enrolled in the school in question. These early affirmative action
programs-which were later followed by other initiatives designed to
increase the representation of minorities on faculties and staff-ranged
from strict quota systems, which set aside a specific number of positions
for minority students, to more complex balancing schemes requiring only
that the minority status of an applicant be considered as one factor among
many in the evaluation of his or her candidacy.
From the start, affirmative action in higher education provoked two
objections. The first was that such programs distort the meritocratic

3. See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth
Transmission, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 722,731-32 (1988).
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processes of selection and advancement that are crucial to maintaining the
quality of higher education itself. If students are selected on the basis of
qualities other than those relevant to success in the enterprise of
learning-on the basis of race or ethnicity rather than intelligence,
discipline, and prior training-then, it was argued, the quality of the
schools to which they have been admitted must suffer. Students admitted
for reasons of affirmative action will fail in disproportionate numbers;
teachers will have to compromise their core responsibilities of instruction
and scholarship in order to meet the special needs of ill-prepared,
affirmative action students; and as a result, better qualified students will
receive a diminished share of their teachers' time and attention-all to the
detriment, it was claimed, of the educational process itself.
The second objection was even stronger. Brown v. Boardof Education
was a contest of right against wrong, of the victims of injustice against its
authors. By contrast, when a college or university adopts a policy of
affirmative action in its admissions program, it creates what opponents of
such policies characterized as a contest of right against right-a conflict
between the defensible claim of minority applicants to a form of special
treatment and the equally defensible claim of non-minority applicants to
be judged by their individual qualifications alone.
Defenders of affirmative action replied that non-minority applicants are
themselves beneficiaries of the background conditions that maintain the
system of defacto segregation from which minority applicants suffer, and
that their ancestors (or some of them at least) helped to create these
conditions in the first place. This response was meant to make the conflict
between minority and non-minority applicants look more like a contest of
right against wrong, and less like one of right against right. But the
response required too many controversial assumptions, both factual and
moral, to ever be fully convincing. It not only failed to persuade opponents
of affirmative action, but also left some of its supporters with an uneasy
conscience regarding the claims of non-minority applicants who would
have been admitted "but for" the existence of an affirmative action
program giving preferential treatment to minority candidates.
At this point, a new argument in defense of affirmative action appeared
that had the advantage of meeting both these objections at once. This new
argument, emphasized by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in
Bakke,4 advanced a simple and attractive claim: that the presence of
minority students in significant numbers is itself vital to the success of the
educational enterprise in which colleges and universities are engaged. s

4. Regents at the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5. Seeid. at311-14.
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One of the fundamental aims of colleges and universities is to provide
an environment for teaching and learning. This is one of the things they are
for.6 But they can best achieve this goal, it now began to be argued, only
with a diverse student body, whose mix of values and experiences creates
the fertile friction indispensable to teaching and learning. The presence of
minority students, whose experience of prejudice and disadvantage gives
them an especially valuable perspective on the existing social order, which
many others simply take for granted, was said to be particularly important
in this regard.
Justice Powell and others claimed that programs of affirmative action
should be viewed as making a contribution to the advancement of the
educational process itself-as promoting an internal educational good.
Colleges and universities must have the discretion, they insisted, to weigh
this good against the costs that such programs entail and to make the
pedagogical judgments involved. And once affirmative action is seen in
this light-as a device for promoting the internal goals of higher education
itself-the claims of disappointed non-minority applicants are bound to
seem less pressing, for no applicant has a right to be admitted to the school
of his or her choice so long as the applicant's rejection can be explained as
a consequence of the school's effort to maintain an optimal environment
for teaching and learning. By recharacterizing affirmative action as a
means of achieving an end internal to the enterprise of education-rather
than as a technique for promoting a redistributive goal external to
it-Powell and those who followed his lead7 succeeded in dampening the
two most powerful arguments against affirmative action, and initiated the
diversity debate in which we are still engaged today.8
The distinction between internal and external goals is not a perfect one,
but it is crucial to understanding what is at stake in this debate. Most,
perhaps all, activities have distinctive internal goals of their own. These are

6. It is not, of course, the only thing. Our colleges and universities also support basic
research and scholarship and are responsible for preserving the cultural artifacts of the past, mostly
in the form of books and other documents.
7. See Ronald Dworkin, The Bakke Decision:DidIt DecideAnything?, N.Y. REV. Aug. 17,

1978, at 20.
8. A third debate sometimes offered against programs of affirmative action is that they tend
to "stigmatize" the minority students who are their intended beneficiaries. Because of this, itis said,
such programs are likely to be self-defeating. When affirmative action is defended on the ground
that it promotes the internal educational good of diversity, this third argument is also rebutted, for
the fact that minority students contribute something of essential value to their colleges and
universities (namely, the distinctive experiences and values they add to those of their non-minority
classmates) puts them on a par with other students and eliminates the inequality from which the
stigma in question is thought to flow. The fact that the diversity argument helps to meet concerns
about stigma further strengthens its appeal and contributes to its current dominance as ajustification
for affirmative action.
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the specific ends toward which the activities in question are directed. The
activity of policing, for example, aims to provide physical security for
those living in a certain community. The activity of firefighting is directed
toward the prevention and control of fires. These are the internal goals of
policing and firefighting, respectively. They are what the activities are for.
If a police or fire department is required to set aside a certain number of
positions for minority applicants, who before have been the victims of
prejudice and discrimination in hiring, the resources of the department are
being used not in pursuit of its internal goal, but to help achieve a fairer
distribution of wealth and opportunities in society generally, a goal
external to the work of the department. The distinction between internal
and external goals implies nothing, of course, about the worthiness of the
redistributive objectives that a program of affirmative action is used to
help secure. It is not a criticism of these objectives to point out that they
are external to the activity to which the program applies. To point this out
is merely to observe that while an activity like policing or firefighting may
be used instrumentally in a campaign for racial justice, the achievement of
this goal, however laudatory, is not what the activity defines in its own
terms as its end.9
The distinction between internal and external goals is, as I have said,
imperfect. It may be, for example, that a police department is better able
to provide physical security to the residents of a mostly black
neighborhood if it hires more African-Americans (on the reasonable
assumption that a racially mixed police force will present a better image
to, and have more authority within, the neighborhood in question). In this
case, a program of affirmative action may be said to promote the internal
goal of policing as well as the external goal of racial justice, or more
exactly, to promote the first by promoting the second. When this happens,
the distinction between internal and external goals is blurred, the latter
being folded into the former and becoming, in effect, a component of it.
But whether this happens depends on the specific facts of the case (it may
be that the racial integration of a police department has no measurable
influence on its effectiveness in the field) and in any event does not destroy
the usefulness or importance of the distinction between internal and
external goals, which even as it loses its sharpness is needed to make sense
of the different arguments for and against affirmative action in particular
situations.
All of this applies in the realm of higher education too. When a college
or university adopts a program of affirmative action in admissions
(whatever form the program takes) its decision may be justified on purely
9. See generally Michael Walzer, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY (1983); Bernard Williams, The IdeaofEquality, in PHiLOSOPHY, POLUICS AND SOCIETY
110, 120-31 (Peter Laslett & W.G. Runcimang eds., 2d Ser. 1969).
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external grounds, as a means of redistributing educational opportunities in
the service of racial justice on a society-wide scale. Or this external goal
may be linked, by a mixed argument, to the school's internal ends-by
claiming, for example, that only in a raciallyjust society can the school be
confident its admissions procedures are selecting the best and brightest,
regardless of race. Or the program may be defended on purely internal
grounds, by arguing that even if it makes no contribution to the
achievement of racial justice generally, it is nevertheless vital to the
creation of a diverse student body, which in turn is essential to the
establishment of the very best conditions for teaching and learning-the
goals whose pursuit constitutes the school's special raison d'etre.
The arguments in defense of affirmative action in higher education thus
run along a spectrum. But it is only the last of these, the diversity argument
which defends affirmative action in purely internal terms, that I intend to
examine here. This argument has always been attractive to the proponents
of affirmative action because it avoids the two objections noted earlier. In
recent years, moreover, the appeal of the diversity argument has grown as
the defense of affirmative action on external grounds has been rejected in
the courts 0 and repudiated at the polls." As aresult, the diversity argument
has had to carry an increasing weight in the fight to preserve preferential
admissions programs in the nation's colleges and universities. The
University of Michigan, for example, is currently a defendant in a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of its admissions practices, which give a
preference to ethnic and racial minorities, and Michigan's entire defense
is based upon the value of diversity as an internal educational good. 12 This
is a sensible strategy, given the growing resistance, both in our courts and
outside them, to the use of affirmative action as an instrument of
redistributive justice. But it increases dramatically the legal and political
stakes of the diversity debate and puts enormous pressure on those in the
debate to be either wholeheartedly in favor of the idea that racial and
ethnic diversity is an educational good, or wholeheartedly against it. In a
lawsuit, one does not have the luxury of being able to adopt more complex
positions of an intermediate kind. So long as the external argument for
affirmative action in the realm of higher education remains hobbled by
constitutional doubts, the concept of diversity will continue to play a

10. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,944 (5th Cir. 1996).

11. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (amended 1996) (Proposition 209).
12. See Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at
23, Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-CV-75928-DT); Brief of
Association of American Law Schools, National Association of State Universities and Land Grant
Colleges, Committee on Institutional Cooperation and Wayne State University at 1-2, Gratz v.
Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-CV-75231-DT), rev'd, 188 F.3d 394 (6th
Cir. 1999).
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central role in the defense of such programs, and so long as it does, the
pressure to adopt an unequivocal view of diversity, either pro or con, is
bound to be intense. But this is regrettable, for it makes difficult if not
impossible a more balanced assessment of the strengths and weaknesses
of the diversity argument, when this argument is viewed not from a
political or legal point of view, but from the internal educational
perspective that is crucial to understanding why and whether racial and
ethnic diversity advances the goals of higher education itself. It is from this
perspective that I now propose to explore the argument for diversity as an
educational good.

II. DivERsrrY OF VALUES AND LIBERAL EDUCATION
The claim that racial and ethnic diversity is an educational good rests
on two propositions: first, that diversity of experience and values is such
a good; and second, that diversity of experience and values is strongly
linked to diversity of race and ethnicity. The second of these claims is
more controversial than the first, and I shall turn to it in a moment. But
though the first is today often simply taken for granted, it has not always
been, and its validity is less obvious than might appear. It is appropriate to
begin, therefore, by asking why diversity of experience and values is itself
an educational good. It will then remain to ask how strong the connection
is between diversity in this sense and diversity of race and ethnicity, and
to explore the educational implications of this connection.
The argument that diversity of experience and values is an educational
good-that it promotes the ends of teaching and learning-often begins by
emphasizing the importance of the interactions students have outside of
class. In a residential college, these interactions are constant and intense,
in other educational settings less so. But whatever the nature and extent of
their extracurricular dealings, students learn from these just as they learn,
in a more structured way, from their teachers. For many college and
university students, moreover, their classmates constitute a significantly
more diverse group than any they have encountered before. The
opportunity to eat, speak and live with others from different backgrounds
can be an educational experience in its own right, quite apart from what
students learn in the classroom.
Yet despite the fact that college and university students spend only a
small fraction of their time in class, and a much larger fraction outside of
class socializing with other students, the classroom occupies a special and
privileged place in the structure of their education. The work of the
classroom defines the purpose for which a community of students has been
gathered; it is what makes them students rather than something else. A
diverse group of young people living and working together in some other
setting (in the army, for example, or a large corporation) might also learn
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from their interactions with one another, but we would not on this account
call the institution in question an educational institution. For us to so
describe it, the relations of those in the institution must be structured
around, and oriented toward, some central activity of teaching and
learning, carried on in a discrete and disciplined way. Hence if one wants
to know why diversity of experience and values is an educational good not
just in the general sense that interaction with others from different
backgrounds is an occasion for learning in any organizational setting, but
in the more specific sense that it contributes to the distinctive goals of our
colleges and universities, it is necessary to ask how such diversity
promotes the specialized activity of disciplined instruction for whose sake
these institutions exist, and to shift our attention from the dorm to the
classroom.
When we turn to the classroom, and the extraordinary range of
disciplines that are taught there, it is not at all clear that a diversity of
experience and values among the students pursuing a given subject
invariably promotes the teaching and learning of it, and hence constitutes
an internal educational good of equal worth across all fields. Indeed, in
certain fields, diversity of this sort seems largely irrelevant to the goals of
education. It is difficult to see, for example, how diversity of experience
and values among the students in a calculus course contributes in a positive
way to their mastery of the material involved. The same is true in the
natural sciences-in the disciplines of physics, chemistry, geology, and
astronomy-and (perhaps somewhat more debatably) in the biological
sciences as well. Historians of science have in recent years emphasized the
degree to which even the natural sciences depend for their construction
upon human judgments of an aesthetic or quasi-aesthetic kind, blurring the
line between these disciplines and others like history and literary studies. 3
But the aim of the natural sciences remains the understanding of structures,
principles and processes that lie beyond the realm of human things in the
very specific sense that their existence is presumed not to depend upon
human acts of judgment or valuation-in contrast to human institutions
(law, politics, literature and the like) which are constituted by acts of just
this sort. This presumption of transcendence, if I may so describe it,
remains a regulative norm in the natural sciences, and explains the fact that
in these disciplines the belief that all inquiries converge on the
truth-single, demonstrable, and accessible to every mind-continues to
be the foundation of learning and teaching. Given this foundational
assumption, it is hard to see how a diversity of experience and values
among the students in a physics or chemistry course can help them reach

13. See, e.g.,Ti-OMAS S. KUHNTHESTRUCrUREOFStENTmCREVOLUTIONS 111-35 (2ded.
1970).
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their goal, which implies a convergence and uniformity of judgment, the
movement toward a single, common truth. Perhaps, one might argue,
diversity of this sort promotes intellectual experimentation, which in turn
makes the discovery of the truth more likely, through a process akin to that
of natural selection. But even if this argument has merit-and that is an
open question-it suggests at most that diversity of experience and values
plays an instrumental role in the natural sciences, and one whose success
is characterized by the progressive elimination of such diversity itself, in
favor of a uniform conception of the structures, principles and processes
of a world that transcends the realm of human experience and values
altogether.
The argument that diversity of experience and values is an internal
educational good can be more compellingly made in the so-called "human
sciences," in those disciplines like history, anthropology, sociology,
literature and law, which have as their object some aspect of the human
world we have made and inhabit. To understand why, we should start by
noting what is perhaps the most fundamental distinction between the
human sciences, on the one hand, and the natural sciences on the other.
The human sciences, like the natural sciences, employ interpretive schemes
of one kind or another to describe their objects. Every theory of the human
world, like every theory of the natural world, is an interpretation of it. But
efforts to explain the human world must also contend with the fact that this
world itself consists of a vast web of interpretive acts, each representing
the purposeful attempt by one or more human beings to create (or negate)
a meaning of some sort. The human world is thus intrinsically or
constitutively meaningful, in contrast to the meaningless world of nature
that transcends it. Those disciplines that seek to comprehend the human
world are thus compelled not merely to use interpretations (as the natural
sciences also must) but to study them as well. For the human sciences,
interpretation is both the means of explanation and its object, the tool they
employ and the thing they seek to explain.
It follows that debates in the human sciences are bound to be
controversial and inconclusive in a way those in the natural sciences are
not. Astronomers may debate the merits, for example, of competing
theories of the origin of the universe. But though these theories are
interpretative constructs, and therefore unavoidably controversial, the thing
they seek to explain is not. The origin of the universe (as astronomers
conceive it) is a meaningless event that transcends the human world, and
its transcendence gives those engaged in the debate the shared hope of
eventually gathering facts that will settle their dispute. Interpretations of
facts can of course always be contested, but astronomers and other natural
scientists presume a realm of facts that lies beyond the debatable
interpretations they offer to explain it. They presume a world of facts that
is free from the partiality and perspectivity of their own interpretations, and
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which can therefore serve as a standard for arbitrating among these
interpretations themselves. This presumption may seem to some a fiction.
But it is a fiction that explains the most characteristic features of the
natural sciences: the shared optimism of their practitioners regarding the
eventual resolution of their disputes, and the fact of scientific progress-a
fact which powerfully suggests that the fiction is not one at all.
Things stand differently in the human sciences. Here, the theories that
scholars and students debate represent attempts to interpret the meaning of
events, artifacts and institutions which themselves consist of meaninggiving acts or complex combinations of such acts. These theories are
always controversial. In this respect, they resemble their counterparts in the
natural sciences. Historians, for example, debate the causes of the Civil
War, offering different accounts of how it began and why. Philosophers
argue endlessly about the relative merits of utilitarian and deontological
moralities. Sociologists dispute the meaning of various rituals of everyday
life. And literary critics clash over the significance of the texts they study.
Theoretical controversies of this sort are perennial throughout the human
sciences. But they are different, in one important respect, from those in the
natural sciences. For controversies in the human sciences typically concern
the meaning of behavior that is itself inherently controversial, and in the
end it is impossible to take a stand regarding the meaning of such behavior
without entering into the controversies the behavior itself entails.
An historian who claims, for example, that the Civil War was caused
by economic factors may be challenged not only by another historian who
insists on the role of Southern honor (though he feels no allegiance to it
himself), but also by a champion of the Southern honor code who insists
that the first historian's underestimate of that code's causal influence is a
consequence of his undervaluation of it. A Kantian philosopher who
criticizes the crude utilitarianism of practicing politicians maybe criticized
by practicing politicians for his failure to assign a positive value (as
Machiavelli did)14 to the brutality and deceit their craft requires. And the
author of a novel may object to a critic's view of its meaning by arguing
that the critic puts too much weight on certain passages and too little on
others. In each of these cases, an objection to the soundness of a theory is
made from the standpoint of those whose behavior the theory seeks to
explain or assess. Often, of course, objections of this kind are raised by
other theoreticians on behalf of politicians, authors, and the like. But the
basic point remains--those who propound theories in the human sciences
always risk being drawn into the controversies that inhere in the purposeful
human actions that constitute their subject matter and cannot insulate

14. See NICCoLO MACHIAVELU, THE PRiNCE 61-62 (Harvey C. Mansfield trans., Univ. of
Chicago Press 2d ed. 1998) (1505).
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themselves from such involvement. One may step back from these actions
and assess them with a coolness the actors lack, and from a point of view
inaccessible to the actors themselves. But the distance between theorist and
actor can never be absolute, and no matter how detached a theorist of the
human sciences becomes, his claims may always be challenged from a
point of view internal to the conduct he seeks to explain.
In this respect, the human sciences can never be "value-free." Their
practitioners must always be prepared to take a stand within the contested
world of human affairs that forms their field of study. They remain,
potentially at least, parties to the controversies they study, for their own
theoretical claims depend upon value judgments that are commensurable
with, and hence always in principle challengeable by, the value judgments
of the human beings whose meaning-giving behavior is the subject matter
of the human sciences themselves.
Theories of physics and chemistry also depend upon the value
judgments of those who construct them (what they think important,
iiteresting, worthy of emphasis, and so on). But the subject matter of their
theories is the meaningless world of nature which represents, ideally at
least, a controversy-free realm that transcends the disputable theories
natural scientists offer of it and which therefore serves as an arbitral point
of reference outside the circle of scientific debate. It is possible, as a result,
for natural scientists to entertain the hope that their value disputes will one
day be settled, that their controversies will gradually diminish as their
contested views of the natural world draw closer and closer to this world
itself. In the human sciences, no such arbitral point exists. The subject
matter of the human sciences does not transcend them, as that of the
natural sciences does; it is continuous with them, and hence belongs inside
rather than outside the circle of scientific debate.
One might express this point by saying that the natural sciences,
however value-laden their theories, seek to comprehend a world that lies
beyond the realm of values, and that in these sciences, as a result, values
do not "go all the way down"--in contrast to the human sciences, where
there can be no escape from the realm of values and its endless
contestations. Here, values do go all the way down, and teachers and
students of the human sciences cannot avoid entanglement in the very
disputes they seek to understand, disputes that can never be definitively
settled, and in which a range of positions (differently defined at different
times) will always be tenable. Physicists may hold out a reasonable hope
of eventually discovering which view of the origin of the universe is
correct. But there can be no hope of ever deciding, with comparable
finality, the causes of the Civil War, or the merits of utilitarianism, or the
meaning of The Magic Mountain.One view may prevail for a time. It may
even achieve a kind of consensus. But in the human sciences, every view
is subject to reversal as other competing value-judgments come to the fore.
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Here, the competition among such judgments is endless and undecidable,
and the dream of escaping from it into the final security of a truly objective
knowledge is a dream illicitly imported from the natural sciences, whose
value-transcendent subject matter permits hopes of a different kind.
Thus in the end, debates in the human sciences cannot be isolated from
the disputes that arise within the realm of human behavior to which these
theories are addressed. Even the most "objective" teachers and students of
the human sciences cannot avoid being drawn into the controversies that
inhere in their subject matter itself. Disputes within the human sciences are
continuous with those of human life and cannot be separated from them.
If to this claim we now add a second-that the values from which the
controversies of human life arise resist ranking in accordance with any
universally acknowledged rule or principle, that they are plural and, in
practical terms at least, incommensurable as well-then the case for
diversity of values as an educational good in the human sciences is
complete. For it follows that a group of students whose values are
diverse-who hold different beliefs about what is important, worthy,
beautiful and good in life-will be more likely than a group whose values
are homogenous to discover for themselves the depth and interminability
of the disputes in which human beings find themselves entangled as
historical actors, moral agents and the authors of texts; and that, as a result,
they will also be more likely to discover the continuity between these
disputes and the theoretical debates of the human sciences.
In a course on the Civil War, for example, it is a benefit for everyone
involved to have some students who admire the Southern code of honor
and others who find it shameful. A course on the morality of politics
becomes livelier and more engaging when one group of students believes
in the inviolability of rights and another insists on the need for dirty hands.
And a course on the modem novel is likely to be more exciting if its
students include moralists who care only about the social consequences of
literature and aesthetes for whom beauty is a supreme value. In each of
these cases, the students' diversity of values gives everyone in the class a
firsthand experience of the conflicts of human life and helps them to see
more clearly how disputes among theoreticians of the human sciences are
inseparable from the conflicts they study.
By contrast, it is no advantage at all, in a course on organic chemistry,
to have students who believe in miracles. Diversity of values contributes
nothing here. It is irrelevant to the work of education in the natural
sciences, whose subject matter is the world of meaningless facts that
transcends the realm of human striving with its endless contests of value.
Whether the natural sciences themselves have value-whether the
knowledge they seek is worth having-is of course a perfectly reasonable
question, but it belongs to the human sciences to ask it. In this inquiry, too,
a diversity of values helps advance the goal of education by making the
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good of science controversial (something especially important today) and
by throwing into doubt the prestige of theories in the human sciences that
claim superiority on account of their reliance on methods drawn from the
natural sciences. But within the natural sciences, within disciplines like
physics and chemistry and biology, the argument for diversity of values as
an internal educational good is highly implausible. Within the human
sciences, by contrast, the case for such diversity is not only plausible but
compelling.
The claim that a diversity of experience and values promotes the
educational goals of the human sciences can be expanded in two ways that
help explain why such diversity should be viewed as an internal good not
only in these disciplines themselves but, more generally, in any program
of liberal education whose aim is to prepare students broadly for the
challenges of life rather than for a particular vocational pursuit and its
specific demands. It is widely assumed that programs of liberal education
have two primary goals. The first is the deepening and refinement of each
student's capacity for intellectual, moral and aesthetic engagement. The
second is a preparation for responsible participation in the public life of his
or her community. We may think of these as the personal and political
goals of liberal education, respectively, and it is reasonable to think that
diversity of experience and values promotes both.
A century ago, the personal value of liberal education could be defined
less controversially than it can today. It was assumed then, as it is now,
that the aim of liberal education is to deepen and refine the student's
powers of observation and feeling. But a century ago, this goal was
understood quite concretely. Depth and refinement were equated with
specific language skills; with the possession of a well-defined body of
knowledge; and most importantly, with an appreciation of the value of
those canonical works that by common consent were regarded as the best
that mankind has produced. The cultivation of such appreciation produced
a particular character type, that of the cultured gentleman (an ideal which
of course included social and economic components as well as intellectual
ones). At the beginning of the twentieth century, the goal of liberal
education was widely understood to be the production of cultured
gentlemen.
This view is no longer credible. The declining prestige of classical
studies, the democratization of American higher education following the
Second World War, and a growing skepticism about our ability to reach
agreement as to which works of art, literature, philosophy and history are
the best, have all contributed to the demise of the ideal of the cultured
gentleman. But to the extent that liberal education continues to be viewed
as something other than a species of vocational training-to the extent it
continues to be seen as a discipline that prepares one not just for a
particular line of work but for the activity of living in general-a successor

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss5/1

14

Kronman: Is Diversity a Value in American Higher Education?

DUNWODYDISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW

to the ideal of the cultured gentleman has had to be found, and this in turn
has required a new interpretation of the meaning of the qualities of depth
and refinement that a liberal education aims to produce.
Today, the most defensible conception of these qualities is one that
reinterprets them in light of the very processes of democratization and
skeptical disintegration that have undermined the ideal of the cultured
gentleman itself. What depth and refinement mean today, for liberal
educators who continue to view the cultivation of these qualities as their
goal, can best be defined as an expansion of the student's powers of
sympathetic imagination, one that affords the student a widened
imaginative enjoyment of views, moods, dispositions and experiences
other than his or her own. This is the personal goal of liberal education, as
its defenders now conceive it.
Most college and university students begin their studies with a
relatively narrow range of convictions and commitments. A liberal
education both forces and helps them to confront views and experiences
that fall outside this range-to take these seriously, ask why they have
value for others, and explore whether they might also have some value for
themselves. Students whose horizons have been expanded in this way will
have a better appreciation of the range of human values, in the double
sense of understanding them better and grasping more intimately the nature
of their appeal. They will find more that is intelligible and enjoyable in the
world of human strivings. And they will be less prone to bigotry and
narrow-mindedness, regardless of the particular careers they choose, and
thus better equipped to get more out of life in general. This remains one of
the basic goals of liberal education. The collapse of the ideal of the
cultured gentleman has forced defenders of this goal to redefine it. The
redefinition of depth and refinement as powers of sympathetic imagination
aligns these personal qualities with the democratic and skeptical beliefs
that have undermined the gentleman ideal, and preserves their plausibility
and attractiveness in a philosophy of liberal education.
It also clarifies the contribution that diversity of values makes to the
personal dimension of liberal education. A liberally educated man or
woman is one who has had a wide exposure to different values and ways
of life; who has developed the capacity to suspend his or her own
judgments of worth and to engage competing perspectives with a high
degree of sympathetic attention; and who has acquired the habit of finding
pleasure in the imaginative exploration of foreign experiences and points
of view. The cultivation of these capacities-of what we might call the
liberal aptitudes-depends upon many things. It depends upon the texts
students read and the curriculum of study they pursue. It depends upon the
kind of instruction they receive-upon the attitudes and methods of their
teachers. And it depends importantly upon their interactions with other
students, in class and out. A classroom of students whose values are
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diverse, who have had different experiences of life and drawn different
moral, aesthetic and political lessons from their experiences, is a more
fertile ground to cultivate the liberal aptitudes than a classroom whose
students are all alike in their judgments of beauty, goodness, justice and
the like. The diverse classroom is a natural laboratory for the kind of
experimentation in judgment and outlook that is essential to the growth of
a student's imaginative powers.
In the uniform classroom, experimentation of this sort remains abstract:
a thought experiment which lacks the passion that can only come from the
real confrontation of opposing points of view that are not merely imagined
but actually held by those engaged in the discussion. In a very real sense,
diversity of experience and values supplies the energy that brings
experiments of this kind to life, and gives them the power actually to
change the attitudes and dispositions of the students who are both the
experimenters and the experimented upon. If one goal of liberal education
is the cultivation of the sympathetic imagination-the development of the
liberal aptitudes-it is plausible to think that diversity of values makes an
important and even indispensable contribution to it.
The same may be said of the second goal of liberal education. This
second goal is political. It is to produce men and women who are wellqualified for responsible participation in the lives of their communities. If
the first goal of liberal education is personal and inward lookingconcerned with the development of the student's own individual powers
of imagination and his or her enjoyment of life-the second goal is more
outward looking and communitarian (though as we shall see the two are
linked).
Today, for Americans and many others, responsible political
participation requires, above all else, a knowledge of and devotion to the
principles of democratic life. That is because all of our public communities
and many of our private ones (family and church being, in some cases,
important exceptions) are based upon the democratic principles of equality
and toleration. To participate responsibly in these communities, one must
understand and embrace the principles on which they are founded. Those
who do not stand beyond the democratic pale-which does not mean, of
course, that they should be exiled or forbidden to speak (for they too are
beneficiaries of the principle of toleration), but merely that they are
disabled from full and responsible participation in the communities in
question. That is something of which only democratic citizens are capable.
The second political goal of liberal education is the production of
democratic citizens, or more exactly, the development of the competencies
on which their citizenship is based.
Foremost among these is a respect for the opinions of others and a
modesty about one's own-an unwillingness to forcibly impose one's
judgments on others when these touch matters of ultimate personal or
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spiritual concern (religious judgments being the most famous example).
The political goal of liberal education is to teach such respect and to train
students in the habit of modesty regarding ultimate matters. To teach these
things, however, it is not enough merely to explain their virtues or to
defend their advantages in abstract terms. Students must also be given a
practical training in respect and modesty. They must not only discuss these
virtues, but acquire them, for only by becoming habitual can respect and
modesty attain the durability they need to survive the rough and tumble of
public life. Only in this way can the bases of democratic citizenship be
preserved against the emotional and psychological assaults upon them.
Here, too, diversity has a vital role to play. In a classroom of soundalikes, whose views of what is right and wrong, lovely and ugly, decent
and base, all conform to a single pattern, respect and modesty can be
taught only as abstract values. Where there is no diversity there can be no
practical education in these virtues. The habits of respect and modesty are
born of friction and strife. One may study them, defend them and praise
them in a classroom of perfectly uniform students. But one can acquire
them only by discovering how deep the sources of intolerance are and how
great the dangerous pleasures of immodesty, and this can be done only by
rubbing up against views one finds strange, hostile or even repugnant.
From the friction of these encounters, which diversity alone can
produce, comes, first, a deeper self-understanding of one's own quickness
to react to foreign values with impatience or disgust and, second, the
slowly developing capacity to keep these reactions in check and to deny
oneself the xenophobic pleasure of their expression. When this capacity is
fully developed it constitutes a distinctive species of moral maturity, the
kind that is peculiar to democratic life and one that represents the political
counterpart of the imaginative sympathy whose strengthening is the first
(personal or internal) goal of liberal education. The cultivation of such
maturity is the second (political or external) goal of liberal education and,
like the first one, depends upon diversity of experience and values as well.
III. RACE, EmNIcrrY AND VALUES
The claim that admissions programs which give a preference to racial
and ethnic minorities are a legitimate means of promoting the internal
educational good of diversity rests upon an argument that proceeds, as I
have said, in two steps. The first is the contention that diversity of
experience and values is such a good, a proposition widely accepted in the
humah sciences and closely connected to the most broadly shared
contemporary understanding of the aims of liberal education. The second
is the assertion that diversity of experience and values is strongly linked to
diversity of race and ethnicity-strongly enough that any serious effort to
promote the former must include an effort to promote the latter as well.
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This second step is more controversial than the first, and the questions it
raises are what make the current American debate over the educational
value of diversity so partisan and bitter.
A skeptic might contend that however strong the linkage once was
between diversity of values, on the one hand, and that of race and ethnicity,
on the other, it has grown weaker as a result of the increased
cosmopolitanism of American culture generally. Today, America's racial
and ethnic communities are, in many ways, more closely joined than in the
past. Cultural exchanges and borrowings among them grow at an
accelerating pace, thanks, in part, to connecting media like television, film
and the interstate highway system. Hip-hop and the style of clothing
associated with it spreads quickly to suburban white high schools; sashimi
appears on the menu of high-end restaurants in Nashville and Denver;
secretaries in Manhattan listen to country music at work; the bagel
becomes a national dish; and evangelism leaps from the revival tent to the
living room at the flick of a switch. These are all superficial symptoms, of
course, but they point to an accelerating process of cultural interactions
that is producing, more fully every day, a polyglot culture in which the
boundaries that once divided America into distinct regions with their
separate dialects, music, worship and cuisine, and that isolated America's
racial and ethnic communities in relatively self-contained cultural domains,
have all attenuated to a significant degree.
In this new polyglot culture, a skeptic might argue, the individual
members of different racial and ethnic communities confront a vast array
of different styles, tastes, fashions and the like, drawn from all corners of
American life, which they are increasingly free to select among and to
combine according to their individual preferences, subject only to the
universal constraint of money. The result is not the disappearance of
diversity of experience and values, but its decreasing association with
communities of race and ethnicity (whose members are no longer confined
to the cultures of their birth) and increasing association with communities
of a consensual kind instead, with communities like the university, the
military and the church, which the culturally mobile men and women who
inhabit our polyglot civilization freely join in pursuit of their individual
goals. A college or university committed to increasing the diversity of its
students' experiences and values might therefore better fulfill its ambition,
on this skeptical view, by adopting a program of preferential admissions
for students from religious or military backgrounds than by creating a
similar program for racial and ethnic minorities, given the breakdown of
the old cultural boundaries that once separated Black fromWhite, Hispanic
from Anglo, Jew from Gentile, Yankee from Southerner, and the
consequent rise in importance of the cultural norms of institutions to which
individuals of all races and ethnicities, the inhabitants of a truly
cosmopolitan America, are now free to attach themselves as they choose.
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There is surely something to this argument. It is hard to deny that
America is today, in cultural terms, more open and fluid than before. But
the argument is overstated and misses the remarkable salience that
race-and, to a lesser degree, ethnicity-continue to possess for the
experience and values of Americans generally. Recent studies,
commissioned by the University of Michigan to bolster its defense of its
own race-sensitive admissions program, underscore the degree to which
black and white Americans in particular remain segregated by residence
and school."S For the most part, Americans of both races still live in
neighborhoods that are racially homogeneous and send their children to
public schools that are dominantly either black or white. Indeed, the
overall degree of residential and educational segregation in American
society appears not to have significantly decreased in the past forty years,
since school busing was first introduced as a means of promoting
integration.16
The causes of this continuing pattern of segregation are multiple and
their interaction complex, making it difficult to determine which
intervention, or combination of interventions, has the best chance of
producing more integrated neighborhoods and schools. But whatever its
causes, the consequences of racial segregation are clear. Children growing
up in a racially segregated environment, white or black, have a set of early
experiences unlike those of children on the other side of the color line. And
these differences of experience in turn shape attitudes, producing
characteristically different beliefs and judgments about society as a whole,
and contrasting impressions of the relation between the two races.
Moreover, these differences of judgment and outlook, formed in
childhood, often persist into later life and retain their influence despite
constant exposure to America's polyglot culture and adult employment in
a more integrated work environment. Occasionally, the differences of
judgment that separate whites and blacks reveal themselves in a dramatic
and statistically significant way. Reactions to the verdict in the O.J.
Simpson trial and, more recently, to the Amadou Diallou shooting, which
divided sharply along racial lines, are a case in point. It also appears that
blacks and whites differ, to a statistically impressive degree, in their
assessment of the fairness with which capital punishment is administered
in the United States.17 And beyond these statistical measures, a wealth of

15. See The Compelling Needfor Diversity in HigherEducation<http://www.umich.edu/-

urel/admissions/legal/expertttoc.html> (visited Oct. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Compelling Need]
(introducing a collection of expert reports prepared for lawsuits, Jan. 1999).
16. See id. (Thomas J. Sugrue, Expert Report, §§ VII-IX).
17. See DeathandtheAmerican, ECONOMIST, June 21, 1997, at 32 (poll stating that seventyfive percent of Americans support the death penalty, while only forty-six percent of blacks support
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anecdotal evidence suggests that race has a large influence not only on the
judgments whites and blacks form about large public events and matters
of general policy, but also on the texture of everyday life, on the tissue of
perception and judgment that forms the lifeworld of ordinary experience,
a world that remains importantly different for whites and blacks at every
level of economic well-being."8
A pattern of residential and educational segregation, with the
differences of experience and judgment that flow from it, exists most
clearly in the case of whites and blacks, but a similar pattern of segregation
by neighborhood and school also defines, though somewhat less sharply,
the relationship between Anglos and Hispanics. 9 Here, too, segregation
implies differences of early experience which in turn entail differences of
adult perception, belief and judgment-differences of values, broadly
speaking. One may regret the fact of segregation and be committed to a set
of policies aimed at its elimination. But so long as segregation remains the
fact it is in America today, the correlation between being white, on the one
hand, and black or Hispanic on the other, and holding a certain set of
beliefs about issues of moral and political importance-about the honesty
of the police, the fairness of the courts, the openness of the economy to all
with energy and talent-is bound to be a strong one. And so long as this
correlation exists to a meaningful degree, it is reasonable to think that a
program of racial and ethnic diversification is a means to, or component
of, the general goal of value diversification-the basic educational goal of
assembling a student body diverse in its attitudes and judgments regarding
matters of normative importance.
This is the second step in the diversity argument, and its plausibility is
reinforced by another line of thought which has played a prominent role in
the debate over the value of diversity as an educational good. Blacks and
Hispanics-and, to varying degrees, other ethnic minorities as well-have
an experience of life different from that of their white counterparts and as
a result form different judgments about the organization of American
society and the integrity and fairness of its basic institutions (police, courts,
schools, etc.). But their judgments are not merely different. They are
different in a certain way. They tend to be the critical judgments of those
who feel disadvantaged by the institutions in question-who feel left out
of the opportunities these institutions confer and the protections they
provide. They tend to be the judgments of those on the margin, and just for
this reason, it is often argued, are entitled to a special respect that
strengthens the case for racial and ethnic diversity as an instrument of
liberal learning.

18. See generally How Race Is Lived in America, N.Y. TIMES, ser. June 3-July 16,2000.
19. See Compelling Need, supra note 15 (Thomas J. Sugrue, Expert Report, §§ VIII-IX).
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This claim, which has an impressive intellectual pedigree and wide
appeal, might be called the argument for the priority of the margin. In its
contemporary form, it goes roughly as follows: Racial and ethnic
minorities are disadvantaged groups that historically have been denied
opportunities open to non-ethnic whites. They have enjoyed less authority
and prestige, possessed a smaller share of society's wealth and power and,
in general, been pushed to the margins of the larger, national community.
Members of this group-those, at least, who have directly experienced the
disadvantage characteristically associated with membership in the
group-therefore see the social and political world of comfortable white
power from its edge or margin. The whites who actually inhabit this world
are so deeply involved in its structures and routines that they fail to see
them as such. Their own comfort and privilege blinds them to the fact that
the world of white power constitutes an organized system of norms,
relationships, modes of discourse, distributive arrangements and the like.
They cannot see this world whole; for them it is not a world at all, and
their obtuseness to it prevents them from reflecting critically upon the
values that shape and define it. Only those who stand outside this
world-only the disadvantaged who see it from a perspective of exclusion
and victimization-are able to perceive it as a whole, to grasp the fact that
it is a world with distinctive (if unstated) principles and practices, and to
subject these principles and practices to critical review.
The marginalized thus enjoy an experiential (or, as it is sometimes said,
an epistemic) privilege vis-,&-vis their more advantaged counterparts whose
comfort and complacency produces an uncritical acceptance that is a
liability in any debate about fundamental social and political values.
Minority students, by contrast, bring to this debate the special
perceptiveness their marginal position affords and thus contribute an
element of critical reflectiveness that would otherwise be missing, to the
detriment of all involved. The participation of minority students thereby
adds to the richness of the debate over fundamental values in a distinctive
and particularly important way, further strengthening the case for their
inclusion in the debate on grounds internal to the educational enterprise
itself.
This argument has, as I say, a long and distinguished lineage. It is
closely associated, for example, with what Nietzsche termed "the slave
revolt in morals,"'2 by which he meant the Jewish-Christian repudiation of
Greek values in favor of an anti-aristocratic view that linked dignity and
spiritual fulf'llment to suffering and humiliation, embodied in the
unforgettable image of God on the Cross. For the Greek philosophers

20. FRIEDRICH NIETZsCHE, THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 168 (Francis Golffing trans.,
Doubleday & Co., 1956) (1887).
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(though not for the Greek tragedians, who saw redemptive possibilities in
suffering), the clearest and best understanding of the world is the one
possessed by the man of intelligence and means who, far from being an
outcast, enjoys all of life's advantages and whose perceptions are truer and
more reliable just on this account. The perspective to be trusted, the one
that serves as a benchmark for the rest, is not, for Plato and Aristotle, the
perspective of disadvantage, but its opposite, that of well-being: the point
of view of the man who is flourishing in all respects, social, material and
intellectual. The idea that a slave-shut out from the comforts of an
aristocratic existence-might better comprehend his master's world than
the master himself, would have seemed to Plato and Aristotle quite absurd.
The Jewish-Christian reversal of values, which championed this idea by
insisting that "the last shall be first,"' epistemically as well as morally,
represented, as Nietzsche understood, the most profound revolution in the
history of Western morality.
The "privileging of the margin" is an especially prominent theme in the
work of certain nineteenth century thinkers, above all, perhaps, in the
writings of Karl Marx. According to Marx, the truth of the capitalist
system cannot be grasped by the bourgeoisie who live in its comfortable
center.2" Only the proletariat, separated from ownership of the means of
production and victimized by the ruthlessly exploitative processes of the
capitalist system, are in a position, Marx insisted, to see the system whole
and to grasp its human deficiencies.23 Only they, cast off and out, are in a
position to discover the true laws of the capitalist order-the nature of the
commodity form, the remorseless drive to produce surplus value, the
resulting mechanization of the production process, etc.-and only they,
acting on this discovery, are able to challenge the capitalist system as a
whole (rather than merely tinkering with its shortcomings in an incomplete
and meliorist way, as uncritical bourgeois reformers do).' For Marx and
his followers (I am thinking in particular of Rosa Luxemburg and Georg
Lukacs),' the experience and critical perspective of the proletariat-its
"class consciousness"-represents the one true, and truly universal,
viewpoint from which the otherwise concealed meaning and mechanisms
of capitalist production, indeed of human history, can be grasped: the

21. Matthew 20:16.
22. See KARL MARX & FREIDRIcH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFEsTO 3-16 (David
McLellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1848).

23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See generally ROSA LUXEMBURG & NIKOLAI BUKHARIN, IMPERIAISM AND THE
ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL (Kenneth J.Tarbuck ed., Rudolf Wichmann trans., Penguin Press
1972) (1913); GEORGLUKACS,HISTORYANDCLASSCONSIOUSNESS, STUDIES INMARXISTDIALECrS

(Rodney Livingstone trans. MIT Press 1971) (1968).
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revelatory view from the margin. As many others have noted, Marx's
emphasis on this idea reflects, in an especially telling way, the Jewish26
Christian roots of his own secular and materialist philosophy of life.
A version of the same idea plays a role in Freud's work as well. Freud
was especially interested in the silly, pointless, garbled moments of human
experience-slips of the tongue, jokes, and above all, dreams. Generally
speaking, we do not take these moments seriously. We assign them little
meaning, if any at all. They exist at the margins of deliberate, waking life,
where our important decisions are made, and contribute nothing to it.
Freud reversed this familiar judgment. He insisted that the hidden truths
of waking life-the wishes and fears and drives that give our lives as a
whole their shape and direction-can best, and perhaps only, be discerned
in the marginal experiences we dismiss as unimportant and stupid,
especially the experience of dreams.2 7 Freud, like Marx, "privileges the
margin" by assigning to dreams, the ejecta of waking life, an epistemic
value that ordinary waking experience lacks, precisely on account of its
settled routines, where familiarity lulls us into a kind of thoughtlessness
about the meaning of the lives we are living.28 For Freud, like Marx, the
truth of the whole first comes to light from the perspective of the margin.
Today, both Marxism and psychoanalysis have a declining intellectual
prestige as comprehensive theories, though many aspects of each continue
to exert a significant influence throughout the human sciences. But the
idea, central to both, that the perspective of the margin has special
epistemic worth, has retained its authority, even as the grand theories of the
nineteenth century that relied on it most heavily have lost their
commanding influence. The religious tradition in which this idea was born
has faded and been replaced, in the realm of higher education at least, by
a robust secularism and a revival of interest in the classical conception of
human flourishing in which the priority of the margin played no part at all.
Yet this idea remains one of the most powerful and attractive in our entire
intellectual armory and continues to draw authority from the JewishChristian revolution in values of which we are all the philosophical heirs,
the agnostic as much as the devout. And so long as this remains true, the
argument for treating racial and ethnic diversity as a means to or
component of or proxy for diversity of values can be supported by two
claims. It can be supported, first, by the sociologicalclaim that the pattern
of residential and educational segregation that still exists in the United
States is bound to produce differences of life experience and, with that, a
diversity of opinions, beliefs and judgments about matters of moral and
26. See KARLLOWrH, MEANING IN HISTORY 33-51 (1957).
27. See SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 9 (James
Strachey trans., Hogarth Press 1974) (1964).
28. See generally id. at 33-34.
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political importance. And second, it can be supported by the philosophical
claim that the experience of exclusion and disadvantage, to which
America's racial and ethnic minorities continue to be peculiarly liable,
affords a perspective on our way of life that possesses a special epistemic
advantage, a special opportunity for comprehension and criticism of the
basic structures, habits and patterns of thought that define this way of life
as a whole. Together these two claims, one sociological and the other
philosophical, powerfully support the second step in the diversity
argument, the contention that admissions programs aimed at promoting
racial and ethnic diversity in a college or university's student body can be
justified on the grounds that they serve an internal educational good by
promoting value diversity of an especially important kind.
IV. CAUTIONS AND CONCERNS

This is the case for diversity and it is a strong one. But if the argument
for diversity raised no difficulties, if it required no qualifications or
cautionary amendments, it would not have stirred the intellectual debate
it has. In fact, the argument does raise genuine concerns and though these
are not, in my judgment, strong enough to defeat the argument for racial
and ethnic diversity as an educational good, they give a measure of
intellectual legitimacy to the positions of those who resist the argument,
and must be fairly acknowledged by its supporters. This is not as easy as
it sounds. As I said at the outset, the diversity debate has tended to divide
its participants into two sharply opposed camps-those who insist that
racial and ethnic diversity is an educational good, and those who deny that
it is-and to eliminate the middle ground from which one might defend
this claim while recognizing the problems it presents. In part, as I have
said, the sharply divisive character of this debate is a consequence of the
fact that it has been conducted, to a large degree, with litigation in mind,
which inevitably encourages a kind of adversarial partisanship that leaves
no room for a view of the mixed sort I wish to defend here, a view of
diversity that affirms its educational value but acknowledges its potential
liabilities as well.
There are four reasons for being cautious about the diversity argument.
Each reflects a concern about the consequences for higher education of
embracing the argument without a candid appraisal of its theoretical and
practical limitations.
First, it is important to recognize that the two steps of the argument for
diversity differ in a crucial respect. The first step asserts a connection
between diversity of values and the ends of liberal education. If this
connection exists-and I believe it does-it is not a connection that is
contingent upon the history of the American republic or the current shape
of American life. It is a connection that transcends everything specifically
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American and which possesses a durability independent of our peculiar
historical, political and social circumstances. It is, in this sense, a timeless
connection. By contrast, the second step of the diversity argument, which
asserts a link between diversity of values, on the one hand, and diversity
of race and ethnicity on the other, does depend for its plausibility on a set
ofjudgments about the special character of American life and in this sense
can only be contingently valid.
More significantly, perhaps, the social and economic segregation that
makes the second step of the diversity argument so convincing is not only
contingent, but also regrettable, and we must sincerely hope that the
pattern of segregation which today produces such a strong connection
between racial and ethnic diversity, on the one hand, and diversity of
values, on the other, will one day no longer exist. The elimination of this
pattern ought indeed to be an important aim of our social and economic
policy as a nation. But if this is true, then the diversity argument depends,
in part at least, on the affirmation of the force of certain facts we hope and
mean to change, and while there is nothing paradoxical or logically
inconsistent in such a position, there is a risk, given the deeply imbedded
character of racial segregation in particular, and its resistance to reform
efforts of all sorts, that the contingent and hopefully transient
circumstances on which the second step in the diversity argument depends
will come to be viewed as permanent conditions and assimilated, through
a kind of intellectual association, to the timeless link which the argument's
first step asserts. There is a natural temptation in a subject as morally and
emotionally difficult as this one to think that the argument for affirmative
action and other race-sensitive programs can be strengthened if the
conditions that justify such programs are made to seem as deep and
intractable as possible, and this in turn encourages the tendency to view
these conditions as timeless and the programs in question as permanent
rather than transitional. But this is a tendency we should resist. Diversity
of values is permanently tied to the ends of liberal learning. Diversity of
race and ethnicity is strongly but only contingently tied to these same ends,
and the failure to keep this distinction in view is likely to produce
confusion concerning the aims of liberal education generally.
The second reason for caution regarding the diversity argument
concerns its implications for what I shall call the "emancipatory" function
of liberal education, by which I mean the development of a student's'
capacity for critical reflection on, and assessment of, the values he or she
has acquired uncritically during the first eighteen or so years of life. The
development of this capacity is clearly related to the strengthening of a
student's ability to take up, with imaginative sympathy, values foreign to
him or her; the greater a student's powers of self-criticism, the more likely
he or she is to be receptive to the competing values of others and to be
prepared to entertain these values with serious and sustained attention. The
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development of a capacity for emancipated self-criticism is also
significantly related to the habits of democratic citizenship, and in
particular to the spirit of modesty that responsible participation in
democratic communities demands. But though it is importantly connected
to these other powers or capacities, which every program of liberal
education seeks to nourish, the power of self-criticism may usefully be
distinguished from them and its development viewed as a third and distinct
goal of liberal education.
To be sure, we all grow up in circumstances that shape us and our
values in ways we cannot control. The values of our families, of our
neighbors, of our social class, of the religious and ethnic communities into
which we are bom-these all have a decisive influence on the values we
come to endorse as we grow into adulthood and are invited, or compelled,
to express views and commitments of our own. This influence is a kind of
fate. We do not choose it, or its direction. It is something we inherit, and
that has already shaped us by the time we first begin to notice its effects.
Nor can we ever escape it completely. For whatever capacity we develop
to examine critically the fate we have inherited, and to scrutinize the values
toward which it steers us, is itself a capacity that must always be
conditioned by the fateful circumstances of our birth and upbringing in
ways we can no more overcome than we can jump out of our own
bodies-which also represent a kind of fateful constraint, however adept
we become at refashioning them with exercise and cosmetics.
But though we can never escape the gravitational pull of the values we
acquire early in life, we can develop a degree of independence from them.
We can learn to ask whether they are the values we want, on reflection, to
endorse, and we can even reject them because they seem, on reflection,
insupportable-or embrace them with greater confidence after reviewing
the arguments for and against. The growth of the capacity to do this is
always a relative thing. It is a matter of more or less, and there is no
absolute standpoint outside the web of our convictions from which
reflective judgments of this kind can be made. But the ability to turn back
on one's inheritance and to question it in a critical spirit, is a real ability
that different people possess to differing degrees, and one of the great
goals of liberal education is to promote this ability by training students in
the (initially quite painful) habit of detachment from the things they value
most in life. This is the emancipatory goal of liberal education, described
in different ways but always as a central educational good, by thinkers as
distinct as Kant, Freud and Dewey,29 and its endorsement gives all

29. See IMMANUEL KANT, WHAT Is ENLIGHTENMENT? 83 (Lewis White Beck trans.,
MacMillan Pub. 2d ed. 1990) (1784); FREUD, supra note 27, at 80 ("where id was there ego shall
be"); JOHN DEwEY, EXPERiENCE AND EDUCATION 36-85 (1938).
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programs of liberal education, whatever their specific content, an
essentially individualisticcharacter.
The linking of diversity of values to diversity of race and ethnicity
poses a potential challenge to this important liberal idea. It does so by
associating a person's values with relatively fixed characteristics whose
fixity tends, through a process of transference, to become a property of
these values themselves. In the case of race, the characteristics to which a
person's values are tied are very fixed indeed---"immutable," in the
vocabulary of the law of equal protection 3 -and because race has been
and remains the starting point for most programs of affirmative action,
including thosejustified on diversity grounds, the less fixed characteristics
of ethnic identity have frequently been assimilated to those of race and
taken on the latter's immutability to varying degrees.
This produces a tension between what might be called the "value
identity" of the minority students who are the beneficiaries of these
programs and the emancipatory thrust of liberal education. The more
closely a person's values are linked to his race, or to other characteristics
that are seen as sharing the immutability of race, the more both he and
others may be encouraged to view these values as being similarly
unchangeable and beyond the power of reflection to adjust. The more both
he and others may be led to conceive the purpose of education not as an
emancipation from fate but as the affirmation of it instead, as the
increasingly emphaticjoinder of each person's most important cares-and
hence identity-to the most fateful characteristics of his or her life story.
The argument for diversity, which links values to race and ethnicity,
encourages this view and hence, to some degree at least, threatens to
impede the emancipatory work of liberal education-not only for minority
students, but for non-minority students as well, whose own emancipation
is compromised by the endorsement of a view that diminishes the power
of freedom in the realm of values and enlarges that of fate.
The wide acceptance of this view can be explained in part, perhaps, by
its growing psychological appeal in a mobile and rootless society whose
inhabitants-minorities and non-minorities alike-suffer the anxieties of
a freedom greater than any known in the past. We are all born somewhere,
to particular parents, and each of us has an upbringing with a local
character. But the composition of our families grows constantly more fluid;
the bounds of parentage are stretched further every day by technology; and
our freedom of motion-geographical, professional, associational-is
unimaginably larger than it was in 1940, on the eve of the Second World
War, and seems to increase exponentially each year. Never before have we,
30. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne LivingCtr., 448 U.S. 432,442 (1985); Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
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or any people for that matter, been as unconditioned by the circumstances
of our birth; some of us more so than others, of course, but all of us to an
historically unprecedented degree. One consequence of this has been the
polyglot culture I spoke of before, with its easy osmosis, from one
subculture to another, of music, speech, food, fashion and the like. Another
is a heightened anxiety about our dizzying freedom itself. Never before has
the emancipatory ideal been as well-adapted to the actual circumstances of
many people's lives, which are bursting with opportunities for selfdefinition, or redefinition. But the uneasiness these very opportunities
provoke reminds us that the emancipatory ideal is not an easy one to live
by, and that it demands a special kind of courage, the kind that consists in
a preparedness to live a certain life for reasons of one's own choosing,
reasons that can never possess the finality or certitude of fate.
One might say that our society tests the emancipatory ideal, or more
exactly our courage to embrace this ideal, as it has never been tested
before, and there are many different symptoms of the discomfort this
challenge produces. One is the growth of religious fundamentalism.
Another is the popularity, among scholar-intellectuals, of communitarian
philosophies like that of Michael Sandel.3" And the diversity argument is
perhaps a symptom, too, for by linking the values a student holds to the
most fateful features of his or her identity, it affirms the grip that fate has
on us in a way that is reassuring to those whose own enlarged and anxious
freedom causes them to wish fate had this power.
A third and related reason for caution in the use of the diversity
argument is its potentially discouraging effect upon the search for truth in
the human sciences-an ambition that, properly understood, is as essential
to these disciplines as it is to the natural sciences and as vital to the
program of liberal education generally.
In the human sciences, as I stressed before, the idea of an object of
study that transcends the realm of values with its endless disputes is
unavailable. In the natural sciences, by contrast, the idea of such an object
serves as a regulative norm, guiding research and informing the assessment
of its results. The work that natural scientists do is shaped, of course, by
value choices too, but rests upon the assumption that the target of all
research, and the final arbiter of all scientific debates, is the valueless
world of nature that transcends our human cares and concerns. In the
human sciences, values go all the way down, and we cannot escape the
conflicts they engender by positing as the true object of study a world that
lies beyond our values, self-contained and waiting only to be discovered.
The natural sciences rest upon this presupposition, which the human
sciences must do without. In the human sciences, the idea of an

31. See generally MICHAELJ. SANDEI., LMERAUSM AND THE LIMs OFJUSTICE (1987).
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Archimedian point beyond the realm of conflicting values, from which
these conflicts might objectively be judged, is literally unthinkable, with
the result, as I have emphasized, that those who teach and study these
disciplines must resign themselves to remaining forever within this realm
with its interminable value struggles.
But it would be a mistake to conclude that the idea of truth plays no
role at all in the human sciences just because the idea of a transcendent and
self-contained world beyond the realm of values plays none. In fact,
debates in the human sciences-in law and anthropology and history and
literary criticism-are guided by a regulative conception of truth. When
participants in these debates offer their views, they offer them not merely
as personal opinions with no more validity or explanatory force than the
opinions of anyone else. They offer them as the best view of the matter
under discussion-as the truest view or, more modestly, as one of the true
views that must be distinguished from all the false ones. Debates in the
human sciences, like those in the natural sciences, are debates about the
truth, not just brutal confrontations of opposing tastes, as when, for
example, Jane says she likes vanilla ice cream and Sam replies that he
prefers chocolate. In a dispute of the latter sort, there is really nothing to
say, and no hope of forward progress. Neither party has reason to ask, or
expect, the other's agreement. But in a debate over the meaning of a novel,
or an historical event, or a tribal custom or a judicial opinion, the
participants do ask for agreement and believe they are entitled to it on
account of the truthfulness of the view they are propounding. They believe
that others can be brought to recognize the superiority of their view, and
will if the debate proceeds in an open and unconstrained fashion. The idea
of a final agreement, among all the participants, regarding the superior
truthfulness of one of their competing views is an axiom of debate in the
human sciences, even if this agreement is never reached but remains an
asymptotic goal that draws the disputants on while eluding their grasp.
How this goal should be defined, and the regulative function it
performs in the human sciences understood, are vexed philosophical
questions to which different writers have offered different answers. Jurgen
Habermas' concept of an "ideal speech situation" offers one such answer.32
Ronald Dworkin's theory of "law as integrity" suggests another. 33 Kant's
account of judgments of beauty offers an approach to this question as
well. 34 The issues raised by these theories, and by the differences among

32. See JURGENHABERMAS,BETVEENFACrsANDNORMS,CONTRIBUTIONSTOADISCOURSE

THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 322-23 (william Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
33. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176 (1986).
34. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRmQUE OFJUDGMENT, IX-LXI (Werner S. PluharTrans.,
Hacket Publishing Co. 1987) (1790); see also HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLUTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 13-14 (1982).
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them, are notoriously difficult and I make no pretense of addressing them
here-other than to note that each of the theories I have mentioned, and all
the others that have attempted to explain the meaning and role of truth in
the human sciences, have been constrained to do so without resorting to
the idea of a transcendent world of self-contained and valueless facts,
whose postulated existence is the validating touchstone of all truth claims
in the natural sciences.
The basic point I want to stress is simply that the human sciences are
truth-seeking endeavors, regardless of how the truth at which they aim is
understood, and not merelyfora for the registering of personal opinions
that make no claim to truth and demand no acquiescence from others. For
it follows, from this basic proposition, that an education in the human
sciences must include a training in the habits of truth-seeking as well as a
deepening of the student's appreciation of the variety and competition of
human values. It must encourage students to continue searching for the
truth even as they become more keenly aware of how wide the gulf can be
between different conceptions of life and the values associated with them.
It must discipline students always to ask, "But which of these values is
true?," though their confidence that this question can ever be answered
diminishes as their appreciation of the irreducible pluralism of values
increases. It must habituate students to seek the common ground of
agreement while broadening their powers of sympathetic imagination and
nurturing their acceptance of value diversity.
But linking diversity in this sense to diversity of race and ethnicity has
the potential to discourage the search for truth in the human sciences, and
to promote instead the idea that a class in law or literature or history or
anthropology is more like a polling station where students vote, or a
market where they register their preferences for different ideas, than a
forum for the shared pursuit of truth. It challenges the truth-seeking
ambitions of the human sciences in a way that diversity of values by itself
does not. The association of value diversity with diversity of racial and
ethnic identity does this by transferring to a student's values the same
qualities of fatefulness and immutability that mark (to varying degrees) his
or her membership in a particular racial or ethnic community. For the more
such membership is viewed as an inescapable condition whose boundaries
are fixed and non-trespassable, and the more closely a student's values are
tied to this condition, the more likely it becomes that he and others see
themselves as the inhabitants of separate and insular worlds, sharing no
real common ground and capable only of the external exchange relations
that characterize trading between the members of unbridgeably distant
cultures.
Of course, this is a matter of degree. Some racial and ethnic categories
are less fixed than others, and the link between these categories, on the one
hand, and the values of their members, on the other, may be tighter or
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looser. But the tendency of stressing this link is to harden the diversity of
values, so important to the human sciences and liberal education, into a
system of mutually impenetrable worlds and to render less plausible the
idea of a common ground on which the inhabitants of these worlds should
strive to stand together. Even as a regulative ideal, this aim will seem
increasingly misguided the more accustomed we become to viewing a
person's values as having the same fixity as his skin color or ethnic
inheritance. The association of value diversity with diversity of race and
ethnicity puts this ideal in doubt; it makes the search for common ground
seem less reasonable and worthwhile. But it is on this ideal that the
concept of truth in the human sciences depends, and as the ideal loses its
appeal and plausibility the very notion that these disciplines are engaged
in a truth-seeking enterprise of any kind becomes suspect and is replaced
with the very different belief that the human sciences can only be an arena
for the expression of values whose relative truthfulness it is as pointless to
debate as the relative truthfulness of preferences for different cuisines.
A fourth and final reason for caution in the use of the diversity
argument concerns its reliance upon the claim of an epistemic priority for
the perspective of the margin. This is a powerful claim, backed by a long
tradition of philosophical support, and much can be said for it. But itis not
free from difficulties, and its invocation in the context of the diversity
debate raises questions we need to acknowledge.
To begin with, even if we assume that the view from the margin enjoys
an epistemic advantage over other perspectives, it does not necessarily
follow that the person (or group or class) on the margin is capable of
exploiting this advantage on his (or its) own. It is one thing to claim that
a certain position in the social order offers a point of view of special
epistemic importance from which the structure of that order may be seen
with particular clarity, but something quite different to maintain that those
who actually occupy this epistemically privileged position are the men and
women best able to grasp and articulate the insights it uniquely affords.
Marx and his followers, for example, who treated the epistemic priority of
the margin as a fundamental principle of method, appear often to have
rejected this last conclusion, or at least to have acted in a way inconsistent
with it.35 The vantage point of proletarian experience is, for Marx, the only
one from which the secrets of world history can be grasped. Yet it took a
bourgeois theoretician to grasp them, and later Marxists (Lenin in
particular)36 stressed the role of the intellectual vanguard in the communist
movement-a bourgeois elite whose function is to articulate the principles
latent in the experience of the working class and to educate its members in
35. See supra notes 22-25.

36. See V.I. LENIN, WHAT Is To BE DONE? 98-100 (S.V. & Patricia Utechin trans., S.V.
Utechin ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1963) (1902).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 5 [2000], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[VOL 52

the meaning of these principles themselves. For Marx, there is, one might
say, a division (oflabor!) between those who provide the experience of the
margin (which possesses a real epistemic advantage) and those who supply
the understanding of this experience, and thereby realize its epistemic
advantage-something those on the margin, whose experience it is, cannot
do on their own and for which they depend on enlightened intellectuals
educated and living in the bourgeois heartland.
There is an analogue in the theory of psychoanalysis. The dreamer,
whose dreams provide the key to the meaning of her life as a whole, is not
herself in a position to grasp their significance. For this the dreamer
depends, initially at least, on the psychoanalyst, who slowly educates the
dreamer and brings her up, as we might say, to the higher level of
understanding occupied at first only by the professional interpreter of
dreams. Here, too, there is a division of labor between those who supply
the experience of the margin and those who comprehend it, a division that
can only be overcome through a process of education in which doctor
instructs patient. This is particularly true in the case of neurotics, whose
unhappy experience Freud believed holds the key to the human condition.
Neurotics, Freud said, are condemned to repeat; every neurosis is a form
of repetition. The neurotic's compulsive repetitions, which display
themselves outwardly as "symptoms" have an inner rationale. They have
a point or purpose, and always serve an end. But the neurotic cannot grasp
this without help. She cannot understand the purposiveness of her own
compulsions and thus lives a life filled with meaning but
opaque-unintelligible-to herself.37 The psychoanalyst helps the neurotic
understand the meaning of her actions. He helps her comprehend her
compulsions and thereby gives the neurotic the only hope she has of
ameliorating her condition, through a complex conversion (which Freud
describes with exquisite subtlety) of action to thought. Left to herself, the
neurotic will go around endlessly in the circle of her habits, never
understanding them and hopelessly condemned to a life of thoughtless
repetition. Only the psychoanalyst can provide the enlightenment that
represents the neurotic's one hope of release."8
For both Freud and Marx, then, the epistemic privileging of the margin
is linked to another, equally important idea: the incapacity of those on the
margin to exploit this advantage for themselves and their consequent
dependence upon intellectual assistance from interpreters not on the
margin but working from a vantage point of comfort and education
instead.39 The link between this second idea and the first one is not,
moreover, an accidental one or a peculiar feature of their particular
37. See FREUD, supra note 27, at 153-56.
38. See FREUD, supra note 27, at 153-56.
39. See supra notes 22-25, 27-28 and accompanying text.
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philosophical schemes for which no larger justification exists. For the very
thing that gives the margin its epistemic advantage, in Marx's and Freud's
account, at the same time makes it more difficult for those on the margin
to seize it.' The condition of the margin is one of deprivation and
victimization (in Freud's case, self-victimization).41 Those on the margin
live beyond the pale of normalcy and comfort. This is what gives their
experience its peculiar importance. But at the same time it reduces the
resources (leisure, freedom from pain, self-respect and the like) that all
human beings, including the wretched of the earth, require to make
reflective sense of their lives. It batters and demoralizes the human spirit,
leaving it ill-equipped for the work of self-understanding. Of course, there
are men and women living on the margin (in one sense or another) who are
not compromised in this way. But there are also men and women living on
the margin who do not see things from a marginal point of view. The
attribution of an epistemic advantage to the perspective of the margin is
thus a generalization-a highly plausible one, perhaps-but in need of
being qualified by another generalization-by the recognition that
marginality itself is often an impediment to self-understanding, which must
be brought to the margin by those whose superior well-being and education
better equips them to grasp the meaning of marginal experience.
If this is true, or even merely reasonable, it has disturbing implications
for the use of the argument from the epistemic advantage of the margin as
a defense of racial and ethnic diversity. For if the same experience of
deprivation and discrimination that creates this advantage also tends in
general to impair those whose experience it is from developing its
intellectual potential, then the students who are presumed to bring the
perspective of the margin to the classroom must likewise be presumed to
depend upon others to elaborate the insights this perspective opens up. To
defenders of diversity, this conclusion is bound to seem offensive-as
indeed it is. But to avoid it one must either assume that poverty,
discrimination, neurosis, and the like do not in general impair the capacity
of their victims for self-understanding-which is psychologically
implausible and morally dubious, if we consider the diminishment of this
capacity to be one of the real harms of victimization itself; or one must
moderate and qualify the argument from the epistemic advantage of the
margin on which some defenders of racial and ethnic diversity rely so
heavily.
For minority students coming from a background of real disadvantage,
moreover, this argument creates a potential obstacle to their selfadvancement, and this is a further reason for caution in its use. Many

40. See supra notes 22-25, 27-28 and accompanying text.
41. See FREUD, supra note 27, at 153-56.
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students in this category-most, perhaps-are eager to escape the margin
for a more comfortable middle class life, and their admission to a college
or university is often an important step in this direction. To tell them they
are there to represent the margin, to be its voice and to speak on its behalf,
is to burden them with a continuing loyalty to an existence they may well
wish to leave behind. One might respond that this wish to escape is an act
of bad faith on their part, or a breach of solidarity, or a failure of selfunderstanding, but quite apart from the hubris of this response, and the
doubtfulness of its moral basis, it frustrates the goal of true integration by
compelling the disadvantaged to play a role they perhaps would rather not
and which in many cases will interfere with their own plans for personal
advancement. The group for whom this argument has the greatest
plausibility may thus contain many who are anxious to deny it, and who
are unfairly burdened with the responsibility of thinking, speaking, and
acting as the argument would require.
V. JUSTICE AND DIVERSITY

In the previous Part, I explored a number of reasons for being cautious
in the use of the diversity argument-for recognizing how dependent this
argument is on contingent and hopefully transient features of American
life, how challenging to the emancipatory goal of liberal education and the
enterprise of truth-seeking in the human sciences, and how troubling in its
reliance on the epistemic privileging of the margin. These are real reasons
for concern, and to endorse the diversity argument without acknowledging
them is, I believe, to set oneself up for attack by those who fail or refuse
to see the very strong case that can be made in support of this argument in
an America that remains sharply segregated by race (and, to a lesser
degree, by ethnicity), where the assertion of a link between diversity of
values, on the one hand, and that of race and ethnicity, on the other,
continues to have great plausibility. It is my belief-my hope-that the
diversity argument can best be defended by recognizing its limitations and
troubling implications for the practice of liberal learning to whose own
internal good admissions programs aimed at increasing racial and ethnic
diversity do make a real, if imperfect, contribution. It is my belief-my
hope-that one can be supportive of the diversity argument and skeptical
about it at the same time, occupying a middle position of the kind I
claimed for myself at the start of this essay. And it is my strong conviction
that only a position of this sort can be faithful to the enduring goals of
liberal education, which transcend our American condition, and
simultaneously remain attentive to the ways in which these timeless goals
must be pursued in the context of our condition, so deeply shaped in so
many ways by our history of racial and ethnic exclusion and by a
continuing pattern of residential and educational segregation.
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Two developments, more than any others, would ease the difficulty of
sustaining this middle position. The first would be an explicit recognition,
by the Supreme Court of the United States, of the constitutionality of using
race-sensitive admissions programs to promote the internal educational
good of diversity. This question is now before the courts in the Michigan
litigation, and an acknowledgment of the constitutionality of such
programs would help to create the necessary breathing space for a more
nuanced and less adversarial assessment of their strengths and weaknesses
by the educators who must now defend these programs without
qualification.
The second development would be a national reaffirmation of our
commitment to affirmative action as an instrument of distributive justice,
and the validation of this commitment in our courts. For such a
reaffirmation would relieve much of the pressure on the concept of
diversity, which today must carry the full weight of legitimating all
programs of affirmative action in the sphere of higher education. The
diversity argument is sound, but it has had to bear too heavy a load of
justification, and this has had a deforming effect on the debate about the
value of diversity in American higher education, forcing defenders of the
idea to close their eyes to its limitations, and opponents to deny the facts
of life that give the diversity argument its power. If the external goal of
promoting social justice by means of affirmative action in our colleges and
universities were once again to have political and legal respectability,
perhaps we could afford to be more equivocal in our judgment regarding
the use of such programs as a means of achieving the internal educational
good of diversity. That, I think, would be a victory for justice and
education alike.
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